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Article 3

Reading Tea Leaves: The Fifth Amendment
and Tax Records
James G. Starkey*

INTRODUCTION

Radical changes have occurred in recent times concerning the
judicial construction of the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination as applied to subpoenaed tax records and other documents. These developments have created a degree of confusion,
causing one judge to describe the role of the lower federal courts in
discerning the present state of the law as that of a tea leaves
reader.' This article reviews the early construction of the privilege, its refinement and its more recent changes. The article also
examines the effect of this evolution on the protection afforded
documentary evidence, especially tax records.
BACKGROUND

The constitutional right against self-incrimination is based on
the fifth amendment, which reads in relevant part: "[N]o person
. . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . .2 The origin of the right can be traced to twelfth
century England and popular resistance to procedures in the ecclesiastical courts, which procedures were calculated to force a suspect to confess his own guilt. 3 Subsequently, the right against selfincrimination was incorporated into the common law and became
firmly imbedded there.4 It was then brought to this country as part
of the legal heritage of the early colonists and added to the Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights.5
It has long been the rule that the fifth amendment must be liber* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. St. Michael's
College, B.A., 1954; St. John's University, J.D. 1957; New York University, LL.M.,
1985.
1. United States v. Karp, 484 F. Supp. 157, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
2. U. S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); see also L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 45-47 (1968).
4. See L. LEVY, supra note 3, at 45-47.
5. Id. at 405-32.
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ally construed in favor of the right it was designed to protect. 6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a witness in a criminal
proceeding is entitled to invoke his right against self-incrimination
as to any question the answer to which might provide merely a
"link in the chain" of evidence required to convict.7 Further, in
addition to the exercise of this right in criminal proceedings, invocation of the fifth amendment has been held to be permissible in
any proceeding if answers given by a person could be used against
him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.8
The right is limited in that it is personal, extending only to natural individuals;9 it cannot be invoked by collective entities such as
2 or partnerships. 13
corporations,' 0 labor unions," associations
Moreover, since compulsion must be present to trigger fifth
amendment protections,' 4 voluntary admissions are not protected,
even for individuals. And only those compelled responses which
are "of a testimonial or communicative nature" qualify for fifth
amendment protection.' 5
The Supreme Court first considered whether the fifth amendment protects documents in Boyd v. United States.16 There, the
government brought a forfeiture action against thirty-five cases of
glass imported by a partnership allegedly without payment of the
required duty. 'I Pursuant to authority granted by the customs revenue laws, the government attempted to subpoena an invoice reflecting the prior receipt of twenty-nine cases duty-free'" as
evidence that the partnership already had exhausted its duty-free
6. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
7. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
8. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973) (grand jury witness); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (custodial interrogation of suspect); Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957) (witness in congressional investigation).
9. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
10. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
11. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
12. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951).
13. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93 (1974); In re Mal Bros. Contracting Co.,
444 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
14. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
15. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (suspect compelled to give
blood sample; evidence held nontestimonial and unprotected by fifth amendment); see
also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (compelled participation in lineup
unprotected by fifth amendment); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (suspect compelled to give handwriting sample; evidence held nontestimonial and unprotected by fifth amendment).
16. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
17. Id. at 617.
18. Id. at 617-18.
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quota.' 9 The import statute under which the government brought
its action provided for substantial fines, imprisonment, or both, in
cases where an individual fraudulently altered or omitted critical
information from any document and thus deprived the United
States of import duties.2" Significantly, the statute also provided
that failure to comply with a subpoena of documents in a customs
case would result in a confession of the government's allegations. 2'
22 an English case in which
Relying upon Entick v. Carrington,
the court reasoned that since "the law obligeth no man to accuse
himself.

.

. [the] search [of his private property] for evidence [to

be used against him] is disallowed,

' 23

the Court held that "any

forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's.

. .

private papers to

be used as evidence to convict him of crime" was impermissible as
a violation of both the fourth and fifth amendments. 24 The Court
reasoned that the "forcible and compulsory extortion" of a person's private papers constituted an unreasonable seizure under the
fourth amendment 25 and, concomitantly, that since the papers
were testimonial in nature, the compulsion involved in acquiring
them violated the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 26 In so holding, the Supreme Court-like the court in Entick-placed great emphasis on the owner's rights in the property
sought. The property-right rationale of Boyd became known as the
"mere evidence rule," which provided that the government had a
superior property right to the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime
19. Id. at 618.
20. Id. at 617.
21. Id. at 621.
22. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
23. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 629 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (1765)).
24. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
25. Id. at 635.
26. Id. Regarding the interrelationship of fourth and fifth amendment rights in this
context, the Boyd Court stated:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments.
They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and
seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for
the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man
"in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable
search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we
have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We think it is within the clear intent
and meaning of those terms.
Id. at 633.
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and to contraband, but not to "mere evidence. '27
Logically, the reasoning of Boyd seemed to call for the protection of documents owned by corporations as well as natural persons. However, since such an interpretation would seriously have
affected law enforcement in connection with corporate misconduct,
the Supreme Court in Hale v. Henkel2" held that the fourth and
fifth amendment protections outlined in Boyd do not apply to corporations.29 The Court reasoned that the corporation was a creature of the state and that the legislature accordingly had reserved
the right to inspect the corporation's property and records.30 Subsequently, in Wilson v. United States,3 the Court, ruling that
neither the corporation nor one possessing corporate records in a
representative capacity had a privilege as to such records, held that
the president of a corporation could not invoke the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination with respect to subpoenaed
corporate records created by him and in his possession.32
In Wilson, the president of United Wireless Telegraph Corporation was served with a subpoena duces tecum commanding him to
produce certain corporate records in connection with a grand jury
investigation.33 The grand jury was convened to investigate
charges of mail fraud which implicated both the corporation and
Wilson individually as its president. Wilson refused to surrender
the documents, claiming that certain incriminating personal
records were included in the subpoenaed documents.34 The district
court rejected Wilson's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege,
holding that the privilege was inapplicable where corporate records
were the subject of a subpoena. Wilson therefore was held in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena.35
27. During an otherwise lawful search, therefore, the fourth amendment was held to
authorize seizure of the former, but not the latter. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 309-10 (1921); see also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1932) (papers held to be "mere evidence"); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927)
(ledgers and bills ruled instrumentalities). The rule was abolished in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), which authorized seizure of "mere evidence" by substituting a privacy rationale for the property-right basis upon which courts had previously relied. Id.
at 310.
28. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
29. Id. at 74-75.
30. Id.
31. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
32. Id. at 383-84.
33. Id. at 367-68.
34. Id. at 369.
35. Id. at 371.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the contempt citation.36
The Court ruled that a subpoena of corporate documents kept in
the normal course of business did not implicate Wilson's personal
right against self-incrimination.3 7 The Court, distinguishing the
facts from those of Boyd, noted that the subpoena did not demand
production of personal records, but only those records created by
the president in his official capacity. 38 Further, the Court observed, the corporation itself, by its board of directors, had ordered
Wilson to comply with the subpoena. Thus, the corporate entity
upon which the documents had been served had voluntarily agreed
to surrender the documents, thereby negating the element of compulsion necessary to a claim of privilege under the fifth amendment.39 Only Wilson's unauthorized actions as president and
custodian of the records stood in the way of compliance with the
subpoena.4°
The Wilson case also contained the first reference to what became known as the "required records" doctrine when the Court
suggested that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination
does not apply to records required by law to be kept. 41 Subsequently, in Shapiro v. United States42 the Court made it clear that
the required records doctrine outlined in Wilson applies to natural
individuals as well as corporations and other entities. 43 The premise underlying the doctrine is that the privilege does not apply "to
records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects
of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established."'
36. Id. at 386.
37. Id. at 377-78.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 376. The Court reasoned that:
[T]he physical custody of incriminating documents does not of itself protect the
custodian against their compulsory production. The question still remains with
respect to the nature of the documents and the capacity in which they are held.
It may yet appear that they are of a character which subjects them to the scrutiny demanded and that the custodian has voluntarily assumed a duty which
overrides his claim of privilege. This was clearly implied in the Boyd case where
the fact that the papers involved were the private papers of the claimant was
constantly emphasized.
Id. at 380.
40. Id. at 376; see also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
41. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380.
42. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
43. Id. at 16-20.
44. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380; see also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 501-94
(1946).
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In Shapiro, the Court allowed the government to compel production, by subpoena, of records the defendant had been required
to keep pursuant to price control legislation.45 Sidestepping the
question of ownership, the majority held that the government interest in the records, illustrated by the statute requiring that they
be kept, endowed the records with sufficient "public aspects" 46 to
justify requiring their production.47
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, strongly criticized the majority's
rationale that records of an undoubtably private organization become public simply by virtue of a congressional mandate that the
records be kept. 48 Taking the majority's reasoning to its logical
conclusion, the dissent maintained, would strip a private organization of its private status because any document could become a
required record following passage of the appropriate legislation.49
"If Congress by the easy device of requiring a man to keep the
private papers that he has customarily kept can render such papers 'public' and non-privileged, there is little left of either the
right of privacy or the constitutional privilege."5 "
The rationale of Boyd was further refined in Perlman v. United
States.5 There the Court stated that natural persons must possess
documents, as well as own them, in order to invoke fifth amend45. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 35-36.
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 32-35.
48. Id. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 64-65.
50. Id. at 70. The trend away from protection continued in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), in spite of Justice Goldberg's comments outlining the purposes of the privilege:
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that selfincriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load," ... our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life" ... our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our
realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often
"a protection to the innocent."
Id. at 55 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 317 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2nd Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd,
353 U.S. 391 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)).
51. 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
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ment protection. 2 In Perlman, the owner voluntarily delivered
documents to the government and then attempted, by invoking the
fifth amendment, to prevent their use against him. 3 The Perlman
Court held that the principle of Boyd protects an owner from the
compelled submission of his property, but does not apply if the
owner voluntarily surrenders the documents. 4
5 5 the rationale of Boyd was further
In Schmerber v. California,
undermined. In Schmerber, the defendant claimed that the government, by compelling him to submit a blood sample for use
against him in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, had violated his right against self-incrimination.5 6 The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on a line of cases which stood for the
proposition that the fifth amendment is a prohibition of" 'the use
of. . . compulsion to extort communications from [a suspect], not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.' ,,57
The Court noted that lower courts also had held that the fifth
amendment did not prohibit "compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or
to make a particular gesture."5 8
To that extent Schmerber did not signal a major change. But
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, went further. The critical inquiry, he stated, turned on whether the blood sample was of a
testimonial or communicative nature, so as to compel the petitioner "to be a witness against himself."5 9 Thus, Justice Brennan
noted, "[T]he privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with

evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.

.

,,,60

a for-

mulation which excluded real or physical evidence from the protection of the fifth amendment and which, taken to its logical
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id. at 13.
54. Id. at 15.
55. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
56. Id. at 760.
57. Id. at 763 (quoting Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)). In Holt, the
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable when a suspect
had been compelled, prior to trial, to put on a blouse that fit him and evidence of that fact
had been received at trial. Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53.
58. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
59. Id. at 761. The Court noted that some state constitutions had phrased the privilege in terms of compelling a suspect to give "evidence" against himself. Id. at 761-62
n.6. The Court, however, was not persuaded that the Framers' use of the word "witness"
required literal interpretation. Id.
60. Id. at 761.
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extreme, would also exclude documents. But the Court-inconsistently, it could be argued, and temporarily, as it turned out--drew
back from the final step and, citing Boyd, reaffirmed that the protection of the privilege reaches the contents of subpoenaed documents.6" Plainly, however, the suggestion that the privilege
extends only to oral testimony or acts of a testimonial character
seriously undermined the property-rights rationale of the Boyd
case and left unclear the scope of fifth amendment protection of the
contents of documents.
The Supreme Court considered the relationship between the fifth
amendment and tax records in Couch v. United States,62 in which a
taxpayer challenged a summons, issued to her accountant, which
demanded production of the taxpayer's records. The taxpayer had
given the documents to the accountant for use in preparing tax
returns.63 Since the taxpayer did not possess the records, she was
not compelled to produce anything, and was therefore in a difficult
position for one attempting to invoke the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' The Court considered the various policies underlying the privilege, particularly emphasizing the right of
privacy,65 and held that as "an intimate and personal" privilege,66
fifth amendment protection was unavailable to a taxpayer in circumstances demonstrating "no legitimate expectation of privacy
and no semblance
of governmental compulsion against the person
67
accused.
the
of
The trend away from fifth amendment protection of the contents
of documents approached a climax in Fisher v. United States.68 In
that case, a taxpayer attempted to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination to avoid having to produce summaries prepared by
61. Id. at 764. The Court expressly considered and refused to adopt the position that
the privilege " 'was directed at the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of guilt, which would thus take the place of other evidence.'"
Id. at 763 n.7 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961))
(emphasis added by the Court).
62. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
63. Id. at 324.
64. Id. at 329; see also Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918) (fifth amendment
held unavailable to protect documents which had been voluntarily surrendered).
65. Couch, 409 U.S. at 327-35.
66. Id. at 327.
67. Id. at 326. The Court noted that there can be little expectation of privacy "where
records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the
information therein is required in an income tax return." Id. at 335; see also In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Manges), 745 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1984) (privilege held unavailable to
sole proprietor when subpoena duces tecum was served on bookkeeper in possession of
records).
68. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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an accountant from the taxpayer's financial records. 69 The summons was directed to the taxpayer's attorney, who possessed the
records.7" Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected both the
notion that the fifth amendment served as a general protector of
privacy" and the property-right based rationale of Boyd, noting
that with the elimination of the mere evidence doctrine,7 2 "the
foundations for the rule have been washed away." 73 Applying the
rule of the Schmerber case, the majority held that the summaries
were not privileged because even if the documents had been held
by the taxpayer, compelled production would not have required
the accused to make a "testimonial communication." 74 The Court
further ruled that insofar as the contents of the summaries were
"testimonial," they were neither testimony of the taxpayer, who
69. Id. at 394-95.
70. Id. at 395-96. Since the attorney had the summaries, the Court concluded that if
an attorney-client relationship existed, and if the client himself could have withheld the
records by invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, the attorney could invoke the
fifth amendment right of his client and avoid production of the summaries. The Court
thus reached the issue of whether the summaries would have been privileged in the hands
of the taxpayer. Id. at 403-05.
71. Id. at 400. The Court stated:
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of
its language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy-a word not
mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to the view that the Fifth Amendment protects against "compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information."
Insofar as private information not obtained through compelled self-incriminating testimony is legally protected, its protection stems from other sources
Id. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)); see also Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), in which the Court held that "[n]o Fourth or Fifth
Amendment claim can prevail where . . . there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused."
Id. at 336. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
73. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407-09. The Court observed that recent decisions also had
permitted the seizure and use of "testimonial" evidence, citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); and Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323 (1966). Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 n. ll. As a result of these events, Justice
White noted, "the prohibition against forcing the production of private papers has long
been a rule searching for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth
Amendment against compelling a person to give 'testimony' that incriminates him." Id.
at 409. The Court further reasoned that even if the papers were facially incriminating,
they would not qualify for fifth amendment protection, "for the privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications."
Id.
74. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood
sample ruled lawfully compelled); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)
(handwriting exemplars ruled lawfully compelled); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (appearance in lineup ruled lawfully compelled).
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had not prepared them, 75 nor compelled, since the contents had
been voluntarily created." Fisher, therefore, signaled that documents are the equivalent of any other tangible property when creation of the contents has not been compelled by the government."
But in closing one door to the privilege against self-incrimination, Fisheropened another. The Court noted that the act of document production itself has communicative aspects because
compliance with a subpoena concedes the existence of the papers,
their possession or control by the taxpayer, and the taxpayer's belief that they are the papers demanded.78 Further, the Court suggested that in some circumstances such "tacit agreements" may be
sufficiently "testimonial" and "incriminating" to trigger the protection of the fifth amendment.79
A scenario left open in Fisher-whethera taxpayer could invoke
his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination to prevent the
compulsory production of records where such records are in his
possession°-was presented eight years later in United States v.
Doe."1 In Doe, the issue was whether, and to what extent, the privilege protects the business records of a sole proprietor. As to the
contents of such records, the answer, predictably, was no fifth
amendment protection. 2 Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
75. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan strenuously
objected to the majority's departure from the rationale of Boyd and its progeny. Id. at
414-17 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
77. Id. at 410 n.11. As to the relationship between the fifth amendment and the
protection of privacy, the majority sharply limited the language found in earlier cases,
stating that while privacy might be guarded incidentally by the prevention of compelled
self-incrimination, protecting privacy was not a purpose of the privilege. Id. at 400-01.
78. Id. at 409-10.
79. Id. at 410; see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 226364 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). The Court held, however, that the rule to which it
referred could not benefit the taxpayer before the Court because existence and possession
were a "foregone conclusion" and the taxpayer could not authenticate the accountant's
summaries. Fisher,425 U.S. at 411-13; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
(Roberts and Ruck), 754 F.2d 918 (11 th Cir. 1985) (production of financial records pursuant to subpoena duces tecum directed to attorneys held not to compel testimonial incrimination of clients).
80. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414.
81. 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984). In Doe, the government served a grand jury subpoena on
the proprietor of several sole proprietorships, demanding production of business records
in conjunction with an investigation of corruption in awarding of local government contracts. Id. at 1238.
82. Id. at 1245. Justice O'Connor asserted what she considered implicit in the majority opinion: "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of
private papers of any kind." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented as to this point because of their concern about the possible unprotected
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reaffirmed that the privilege applies only to compelled self-incrimination and that when records are voluntarily prepared, no compulsion exists as to their content.8 3 The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals on this point since the lower court had erroneously held that fifth amendment protection existed with respect to
the contents of the documents.84
But regarding the act of production, the Supreme Court agreed
with the district court 5 and court of appeals8 6 that the act of producing the documents involved testimonial self-incrimination. 7
The Court noted that the respondent had not conceded that the
records existed or were in his possession and that production by
the respondent would relieve the government of the need for authentication. 8 The government had not been precluded from demonstrating that possession, existence, and authentication were
"foregone conclusions," the Court observed, but no such showing
had been made. 9
The final issue presented was whether, if production was protected by the fifth amendment, the government could obtain documents without a formal grant of immunity pursuant to 18 USC
§§ 6002 and 6003. 90 The Court held that a formal grant of immustatus of such papers as diaries and personal letters. Id. at 1245-46 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1241. Further, the Court noted, a subpoena duces tecum does
not compel oral testimony, nor, ordinarily, does it "compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or reaffirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id. (quoting Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976)).
84. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1245. Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with the majority's
finding that the court of appeals had held the contents of the records privileged. Id. at
1247 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justices Marshall and Brennan
agreed with Justice Stevens on this point. Id. at 1245 (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
85. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1243 n. 11. " 'With few exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and that they are authentic.' " Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 19,
1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981)).
86. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1243 n.12. " '[W]e find nothing in the record that would indicate that the United States knows, as a certainty, that each of the myriad documents
demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's possession or subject to his
control.' " Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 335
(3d Cir. 1982)).
87. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1243.
88. Id. at 1243 n.13. The Court concluded that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real, not trifling or imaginary." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1243. Section 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
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nity was necessary, rejecting the government's argument that the
courts could prohibit incriminatory use of production without resort to the statutory procedures. 9' At the same time, however, the
Court also rejected the respondent's argument that a grant of use
immunity must cover the contents of the documents as well as the
act of production. Since only the act of production is protected by
the privilege, the Court ruled, only the self-incrimination that
might accompany production must be immunized.92
THE FISHER AND DOE CASES: IMPLICATIONS

A.

Contents of Documents and the Boyd Rationale

As Justice O'Connor observed in the concurrence to United
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an
order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving
a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
Section 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of
the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district
court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the
United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to
give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General,
the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General,
request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982). A useful discussion of these statutes can be found in United
States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1984).
91. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1244. The result in Doe has moved one court to conclude that
so-called "pocket immunity" (by use of "letters of assurance") is not only a "damnable
practice," but also "clearly illegal." United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1336
n.13 (D. Colo. 1984).
92. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1244-45.
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States v. Doe,93 the relentless, inescapable logic of Fisher "sounded
the death knell for Boyd." 94 "[T]he Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any
kind." 95 Yet, defying all logic, the corpse keeps sitting up. While
Justice O'Connor's conclusion logically flowed from the Court's
prior decisions, Justices Marshall and Brennan strenuously disputed her conclusion insofar as it included items such as personal
diaries. 96 Indeed, since Doe, several lower courts have determinedly reaffirmed the validity of the Boyd rationale insofar as it
relates to documents of a peculiarly personal nature. 97 The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit even held that the doctrine of
Boyd still protects documents such as "[p]rivate financial and commercial records." 98 Some writers have also expressed the hope or
expectation that the government still will be prevented from examining "intimate private documents free of constitutional restriction." 99 In this light it seems fair to say, at least, that reports of the
total demise of the Boyd rule have been exaggerated. How grossly
exaggerated remains to be seen.
B. Fifth Amendment Protection Against Act
of Production Self-Incrimination
The apparent almost total elimination of fifth amendment protection of the contents of tax records and other documents has
caused considerable consternation in some legal and tax circles," °
93. Id. at 1245 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1245-46 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
97. See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 745 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated as
moot, 105 S. Ct. 1861 (1985); In re Grand Jury Investigation, Special Grand Jury No. II,
Sept. Term, 1983, 600 F. Supp. 436, 437-38 (D. Md. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Served Feb. 17, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
98. United States v. (Under Seal), 745 F.2d 834, 840 n. 12 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated as
moot, 105 S. Ct. 1861 (1985). The court interpreted the Doe case as merely adding sole
proprietorships to the list of artificial entities, like corporations and partnerships, denied
the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 839. As to the government's argument that the fifth
amendment did not protect the contents of preexisting documents, the court conceded
that the Supreme Court had said as much, but took the view that the Supreme Court had
not so held. "The government here relies on dicta in several recent decisions of the Court
to support its view. The dicta are assuredly there, but none of these decisions has overruled Boyd." Id.
99. See Glekel & Sagor, Act of Production Immunity. New Rules for Subpoenas,
N.Y.L.J. Apr. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 3.; see also Note, Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protection for the Contents of Preexisting Documents: United States v. Doe, 38 Sw. L.J. 1023
(1984).
100. See Comiskey & Comiskey, Court in Doe Limits Fifth Amendment Protection,
But Uncertainty Remains, 61 J. TAX'N 66, 67, 70 (1984).
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and understandably so. Act of production protection seems a poor
and uncertain substitute for the content protection of Boyd. Furthermore, the grounds on which the Fisher Court denied fifth
amendment protection are arguably at variance with established
fifth amendment principles. For example, the Fisher Court denied
fifth amendment protection if "existence and location of the papers
are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to
the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that
he in fact has the papers.""1 ' That is, since the implied admissions
of existence and possession which attend production were unimportant to the government's case, the Fisher Court could conclude
that compelling production "would not itself involve testimonial
self-incrimination." 1 °2 Justice Brennan and some commentators
found this test of what is "sufficiently testimonial"'01 3 to be novel
and even unnerving.'"
A second ground for denying fifth amendment protection in
Fisher was that production would not "appear to represent a substantial threat of self-incrimination" since production by the taxpayer would not impliedly authenticate the documents. 0 5 At least
one writer has construed this as requiring that the implied admissions be incriminating on their face and as suggesting that evidence
can be insufficiently incriminating as a matter of degree.' 0 6 Both of
these propositions, espoused in Fisher as bases for denial of fifth
amendment protection, run contrary to a substantial body of fifth
amendment law which holds that "the privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself
in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of
0 7
incrimination." 1
101. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. "I know of no Fifth Amendment principle which makes the testimonial nature
of evidence and, therefore, one's protection against incriminating himself, turn on the
strength of the Government's case against him." Id. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring);
see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Feb. 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1016-17
(E.D. Wash. 1984); Glekel & Sagor, supra note 99, at 2.
105. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 413; see also United States v. Reis, 765
F.2d 1094, 1096 (1lth Cir. 1985) (summons for tax records enforced; claim of fifth
amendment privilege not sustained because taxpayer did not show "substantial and real
hazards of self-incrimination").
106. See Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's
Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 476 (1984).
107. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); see also Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-88 (1951); In re Portell, 245 F.2d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1957);
United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952). The rule embodied in these
cases is that the invocation of the privilege should be upheld if the claimant can sketch a
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Even more disconcerting was the notion expressed in Fisher that
by the simple expedient of granting use immunity-immunity
which would cover only the admissions of existence, possession or
authentication implied in the act of production-the government
could lay bare and unprotected the incriminating contents of virtually any tax record or other document. 1 8 Even before the Doe case
was decided, the vulnerability of business tax documents moved
one writer to suggest a planned, timed destruction of tax records
not covered by a legal requirement of continued maintenance. 1°9
The practical effect of the rule announced in Fisher, however,
has yet to fulfill the dire prophecies of the pessimists. While the
rule has generated substantial confusion in the lower courts, a high
percentage of individuals invoking the fifth amendment with respect to records in their possession have succeeded when urging
0 This trend was reinforced
the act of production privilege. 11
by the
scenario whereby a seemingly harmless admission could provide even a link in the chain
of evidence necessary to prosecute.
108. See, e.g., Comiskey & Comiskey, supra note 100, at 66, 69; Note, supra note 99,
at 1037. Concern presumably increased when some courts took the reasoning of Schmerber, Gilbert and Fisher to (or beyond) its logical extreme and compelled a taxpayer to sign
a consent authorizing an off-shore bank to produce any records relating to accounts of
the taxpayer. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Thier), 767 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1985);
In re United States Grand Jury Proceedings, W. Dist. of La. (Cid), 767 F.2d 1131 (5th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 328 (1984). But see In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Doe), 599 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that consent
forms constituted incriminating testimony and that production of records by the bank
would constitute an implied admission of depositor's control). See also Ghidoni, 732 F.2d
at 819 (Clark, J., dissenting) (compelling taxpayer to sign compels testimony: "Iconsent
109. See Fishman, IntentionalDestructionof Tax Work Papers. An Analysis of a Relatively Uncharted Area, 58 J. TAX'N 214 (1983).
110. See, e.g., In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1985) (invocation of privilege by
attorney upheld when production would identify and authenticate records); United States
v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1983) (invocation of privilege by doctor upheld when existence of records not "foregone conclusion"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Martinez),
626 F.2d 1051 (1st Cir. 1980) invocation of privilege by doctor upheld when production
would authenticate records); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Doe), 599 F. Supp. 746
(S.D. Tex. 1984) (invocation of privilege upheld when depositor resisted signing consent
that bank produce records of accounts); In re Heuwetter, 584 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (invocation of privilege upheld when existence of records in doubt); see also
Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511
(9th Cir. 1984); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum (Doe), 605 F. Supp. 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (hearing ordered in each case
concerning whether act of production privilege applicable). But see United States v.
Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1985), wherein the fifth amendment privilege was
ruled unavailable to a defendant who had helped a federal agent locate certain files during
a search of defendant's office. The court held that even if the assistance had been compelled, the privilege would apply only to the authentication of the records inferable from
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Doe Court's deference to the claim of the privilege as to the act of
production' and that Court's insistence that the government observe all formalities 2when it seeks to compel production by granting use immunity." 1
The requirement that the government obtain a formal grant of
immunity will complicate matters considerably for the government. As knowledgeable commentators have observed, the government had a large stake in the argument that informal grants of
immunity are sufficient to compel the act of production; compliance with the requirements of the immunity statutes requires approval by high level Justice Department officials and can entail
substantial and time-consuming administrative burdens. "13 Moreover, when a grant of immunity is at issue, the government's administrative burden will frequently be compounded by another,
more delicate problem: the requirement that the government be
able to establish both that no testimony or information obtained
from a person pursuant to an immunity grant was used against
him, and that no information "directly or indirectly derived from
such [immunized] testimony or information"'' was used against
him. Thus, the government's burden in this context is twofold:
first, it must refrain from exploiting any leads obtained from immunized evidence, and second, it must be able to prove that it so
refrained.1' Since the contents of the documents are not privileged and, therefore, not the subject of an immunity grant," 6 the
government will frequently have little difficulty carrying its burden
of proof as to authentication. For example, the contents of the
documents often will connect the documents to the one who proThe burden also will be easy to satisfy when the
duced them.'
defendant's conduct, not to the contents, and noted that at trial the assistance given was
brought out by the defendant, not the government. Id. at 1327.
111. The Fisher case can be read to suggest that this was by no means inevitable.
There, the Court appeared to imply that the act of production would rarely be testimonial
or incriminating enough to trigger fifth amendment protection. See Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-13 (1976); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727
F.2d 941, 943-44 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 90 (1984).
112. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
113. See Glekel & Sagor, supra note 99, at 1, 2; UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, Title I, chapter 11 (1977).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
115. "One raising a claim under [18 U.S.C. § 6002] need only show that he testified
under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent
sources." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972).
116. See United States v. Doe, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 1244 n.17 (1984).
117. See, e.g., In re Proceedings Before the Aug. 6, 1984 Grand Jury, 767 F.2d 39 (2d
Cir. 1985) (order holding appellant in contempt affirmed; appellant had refused to pro-
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government already has independent evidence from another source
(e.g., a bookkeeper) that the records exist and are the records of the
party producing them.
But when non-self-authenticating documents are produced pursuant to a grant of immunity, and there is no independent source to
establish existence and authenticity, the government's burden becomes much heavier. This is evident from the fact that the government's position-as it conceded in Doe-must be no better than it
would have been had the documents been found in the street or
had they arrived anonymously in the mail." 8 In such a case there
would be no occasion, apart from the act of production, for the
government to focus on a witness capable of either connecting the
records to the producer or authenticating them." 9 It is easy to
envision a situation where the government cannot carry its heavy
burden of establishing that there was no exploitation (derivative
use) of immunized information. Indeed, as the Supreme Court
noted in Doe,' the logical extreme of such a scenario could jeopardize not only the 2admissibility
of documentary evidence, but an
1
entire prosecution.'

duce tape recording of discussion with others concerning payment of sales taxes after
grant of immunity as to the act of production).
118. See Government's Reply Memorandum at 10, 12, United States v. Doe, 104 S.
Ct. 1237 (1984).
119. A scenario which has been suggested along these lines is the production under
an immunity grant of incriminating handwritten business records which do not reveal
their identity on their face and concerning which the government did not in advance have
independent evidence spelling out their existence and identity. In such circumstances
resort to a third party witness or a handwriting expert to connect the handwriting to the
producer, it is argued, would constitute a clear case of evidence "indirectly derived" from
immunized information since there would be no reason to even attempt to connect the
records to the target if the records had been found on the street instead of having been
produced by him. The same reasoning, it is said, would apply in the case of immunized
production of a gun which led to ballistics evidence connecting the producer to a crime.
See Glekel & Sagor, supra note 99, at 1,2. Contrast the scenario of a gun that has a serial
number-unprivileged "contents"-which enables the authorities to connect it to the
producer through the vendor. See Comiskey & Comiskey, supra note 100, at 96 n.32.
The same writers suggest that the government could connect unauthenticated documents
to the producer by means of handwriting exemplars, but the analysis-which apparently
assumes no independent evidence of existence and authenticity-seems to overlook the
doctrine of derivative use discussed above. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. "The decision to seek use immunity necessarily involves a balancing of the Government's interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation." United States
v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (1984).
121. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) (convictions
vacated; proof of independent source of trial evidence not sufficient where prosecutor had
requested and read the immunized testimony); see also United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d
51 (2d Cir. 1977) (case remanded for further hearing; prosecutor's assertion that immu-
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The most remarkable recent development concerning the privilege against self-incrimination is the incidence of cases which hold
that representatives of entities,122 an important class of individuals
not previously thought to be covered by Boyd, can invoke the act
of production privilege as individuals. 1 23 The act of production
nized testimony was not used held insufficient to prove independent source); United
States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976) (case remanded for further proceedings on
the issue of independent source after trial court had held that government had failed to
prove independent source).
122. Prior to Fisherit seemed settled that the privilege against self-incrimination did
not apply to an entity such as a corporation or partnership, and that the fifth amendment
could not be invoked by a person holding the records of an entity in a representative
capacity, even if the person had prepared the records and was incriminated by them. See,
e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974); Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S.
361, 374-75 (1911). Similarly, there was authority for the proposition that a representative could not invoke the privilege when required to authenticate the records. See United
States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1929).
In Fisher, however, the Court seemed to suggest that when either existence or possession of subpoenaed documents is not a foregone conclusion and is sufficiently "in issue,"
the act of production privilege is available to representatives of entities who would be
personally incriminated by production.
This Court has also time and again allowed subpoenas against the custodian
of corporate documents . . . over claims that the documents will incriminate
the custodian despite the fact that producing the documents tacitly admits their
existence and their location in the hands of their possessor. . . . The existence
and possession or control of the subpoenaed documents being no more in issue
here than in the above cases, the summons is equally enforceable.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1976) (citations omitted).
As to the aspect of production of records (by the representative of an entity) that
would imply a belief or representation that the papers produced are those demanded by
the subpoena-"implicit authentication"-the Court seemingly reaffirmed the traditional
rule.
Moreover, in [prior cases] the custodian of corporate, union or partnership
books or those of a bankrupt business was ordered to respond to a subpoena for
the business' books even though doing so involved a "representation that the
documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena."
Id. at 413 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)). Further, the
Court stated: "In these cases compliance with the subpoena is required even though the
books have been kept by the person subpoenaed and his producing them would itself be
sufficient authentication to permit their introduction against him." Fisher, 425 U.S. at
413 n.14.
123. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir.
1985) (court acknowledges right of corporate representative to invoke act of production
privilege individually in a proper case; corporation required to produce records through
agent who will not be incriminated); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3rd
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (order holding principal in corporation in contempt reversed absent
district court finding that production and authentication of corporate records would not
incriminate him personally); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
the act of production privilege may be available to principals of corporations when existence and location of corporate records not a foregone conclusion); see also In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (government
precluded from using act of production by corporate representatives against the repre-
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privilege has been ruled available to a former employee who holds
corporate records in a representative capacity,' 24 and even to a former corporate officer who wrongfully misappropriated corporate
records. 25 Nevertheless the majority view, which arguably has
greater historical support, is to the contrary.' 26
sentatives as individuals after corporate records are produced pursuant to subpoena duces
tecum); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Lincoln), 767 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1985) (act of
production privilege ruled unavailable to representative of entity except when act of production would identify entity and admit control); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 8,
1983, 722 F.2d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1458 (1984) (government precluded from using act of production by corporate representatives against the
representatives individually after corporate records are produced pursuant to subpoena
duces tecum); In re Grand Jury 83-8 (MIA) Subpoena Duces Tecum (Martin and Hernandez), 611 F. Supp. 16 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (government precluded from using act of production by corporate representatives against the representatives individually after
corporate records are produced pursuant to subpoena duces tecum; In re Heuwetter, 584
F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (subpoena for corporate records modified because production would impliedly admit existence of corporations and documents).
124. In re Grand Jury Investigation, Special Grand Jury No. II, Sept. Term, 1983,
600 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Md. 1984).
125. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22,
1983, 722 F.2d 981, 987 (2d Cir. 1983) (privilege held available to former president of
corporation on basis that production would impliedly admit possession and misappropriation of records, tending to show knowledge of incriminating contents); see also United
States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985) (government conceded that individual holding records in representative capacity can enjoy act of production privilege
against self-incrimination after individual's relationship with entity has ended, but successfully urged that the privilege had been waived). Cf Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85 (1974) (privilege against self-incrimination held not available to former partner of dissolved firm because partnership ruled an independent entity, but case decided prior to the
Fisher case, and act of production privilege apparently not squarely invoked or
considered).
126. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.
1985) (en banc) (act of production privilege held unavailable to corporate representative
when records subpoenaed by grand jury); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Lincoln), 767 F.2d
1130 (5th Cir. 1985) (act of production privilege held unavailable to representative of
collective entity when records subpoenaed by grand jury); United States v. G & G Advertising Co., 762 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1985) (order enforcing IRS summons concerning
corporate records affirmed; act of production privilege held unavailable to representative
of corporation); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511, 1512 (9th Cir. 1984) (order enforcing summons for tax records reversed with instruction that "an individual may not
assert the fifth amendment privilege to avoid producing the records of a collective organization where he possesses such records in a representative capacity"); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941, 944-45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90
(1984) (act of production privilege held inapplicable to attorney who held subpoenaed
files in representative capacity for client); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 8, 1983, 722
F.2d 294, 296 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1458 (1984) (act of production
privilege held unavailable to corporate representative when corporate records subpoenaed
by grand jury); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Martinez), 626 F.2d 1051, 1053 (1st Cir.
1980) (act of production privilege held available to doctor when appointment books subpoenaed, the court noting that privilege is not applicable to custodian or creator of corporate records); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Doe), 605 F. Supp. 174, 175
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (act of production privilege stated to be unavailable to individuals pos-
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Tax Records, the Fisher and Doe Cases and the Required
Records Doctrine

For obvious reasons, tax lawyers over the years have regularly
cast wary glances at the required records doctrine.'27 As noted
above, the seeds of the rule were planted in Wilson,'28 and it
sprouted into full bloom in Shapiro.1 29 Under this doctrine, when
federal or state law requires that records be kept, the one required
to keep them has no fifth amendment privilege when ordered to
produce the records.13 0 The rule was further refined in Grosso v.
United States,' which set forth a three-pronged test which must
be satisfied before documents will constitute "required records."
First, the requirement that the documents be kept must be essentially regulatory, as opposed to punitive; second, the records must
be of a kind customarily kept by the regulated party; and, third,
the records themselves must have assumed "public aspects" which
render them analogous to public documents.132 Despite the appar33
ent vulnerability of tax records to the required records doctrine,' 1
the government, apparently as a matter of policy, 13 did not urge
the application of the rule in tax cases for many years after Shapiro
had been decided. 35 In recent years, however, there has been a
sessing records of entity in representative capacity. Hearing ordered to determine
whether partnership more like corporation or sole proprietorship); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Allied Auto Sales, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.R.I. 1983)
(act of production privilege held inapplicable to custodian of corporate records); see also
In re Application of Doe, 603 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Gel
Spice Co., 601 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Segmond v. United States, 589 F.
Supp. 568, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Butcher, 38 Bankr. 796, 799 n.4 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1984), affid in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465 (6th
Cir. 1985).
127. See, e.g., Bittker, FederalIncome Tax Return-Confidentialityv. Public Disclosure, 20 WASHBURN L. J. 479, 486 (1981); Comiskey & Comiskey, supra note 100, at 70.
128. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
130. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1948).
131. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
132. Id. at 67-68.
133. Curiously, it is possible that the privilege against self-incrimination, though
routinely accepted by the IRS as a barrier to an administrative summons, is not
applicable to the books and records that taxpayers are required by I.R.C.
§ 6001 to maintain. This tantalizing possibility-so at odds with common understanding-stems from Shapiro v. United States ....
Bittker, supra note 127, at 485.
134. See United States v. Fox, 554 F. Supp. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 721 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1983).
135. Bittker, supra note 127, at 485. Indeed, the Tax Division of the Department of
Justice, in essence, conceded that tax records did not constitute required records. See
TAX DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR CRIMINAL TAX TRIALS 103
(1973); see also Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459, 462 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969); United
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discernible trend in the other direction. 36 In one case a court held
that not only a doctor's W-2 forms and prescription forms, but also
his patient files, were required records. 3 " Overall, however, the
results of government efforts to urge application of the required
records doctrine to tax records have been spotty. 3 ' Further,
respected commentators have complained that the rule is unclear, 39 and recently the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has called into question whether, since the shift away from the privacy rationale of Boyd, the rule has outlived its usefulness."
Plainly the final words concerning the viability of the rule and its
applicability to tax records have yet to be written.
CONCLUSION

Despite occasional twitches, fifth amendment protection of the
contents of documents appears to be moribund. This seems especially true with respect to tax records which, in the usual case,
would not qualify for the exception for peculiarly personal documents (diaries, etc.) urged by Justices Marshall and Brennan in
Doe. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies-if at all-only to the act of production, and only insofar as
production impliedly admits the existence, possession or authentication of the records. However, because this newly developed fifth
amendment rule is somewhat ambiguously stated, and is arguably
at variance with some well-established fifth amendment princiStates v. Fox, 554 F. Supp. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); R. FINK, TAX FRAUD, § 10.04 [2]

(1st ed. 1980).
136. In the Doe case, the district court held that such tax records as tax returns and
W-2 statements constituted required records. Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled Mar.
19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981), af'd, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982), af'd in part,
rev'd in part, sub nom. United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984). The taxpayer did
not appeal the ruling, however, so the issue was not before either the court of appeals or
the Supreme Court. See Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1240 n.3; see also United States v. Porter, 711
F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1983) (government unsuccessfully urged that taxpayer's cancelled
checks and deposit slips were "required records"); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served
Feb. 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1017 (E.D. Wash. 1984) (government urged that taxpayer's copies of tax returns were "required records," but issue was moot).
137. In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1983). In his concurring opinion, Judge
Friendly strenuously objected to the compelled production of the patient files. Id. at 1194
(Friendly, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
138. See supra note 135.
139. See In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1196 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("Thirty-five years after its pronouncement, the contours of the
exception remain largely undefined.").
140. See United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1984). "There is precedent
for holding that W-2's and forms 1099 are required records .

. .

. Whether the required

records exception, which was a response to the Boyd privacy rationale, is still viable after
the shift away from the privacy rationale, remains to be decided ....
" Id. at 918 n.4.
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ples,1 4 ' substantial confusion has occurred and endures in the
lower courts. This confusion has engendered lines of cases that go
both ways on the question of whether representatives of entities, a
class previously excluded from the privilege against self-incrimination, may personally invoke the act of production privilege as to
records of the entity. The confusion has extended to the tax area,
in which there has arisen a new government inclination to urge
that the required records exception apply to tax records. In the tax
area the parameters of the rule remain inexact, its interpretations
are diverse, and the future is difficult to predict. But, regardless of
the context, it is probable that any fifth amendment protection of
the contents of personal documents which still exists soon will be
gone.

141. As one writer has noted, the statement of the applicable principles also necessarily implies problems in administration of the rule. When the fifth amendment is invoked and documents withheld, the court must rule as to each document and determine
(1) whether the admission of existence, possession and responsiveness of the document
will incriminate to a sufficient extent, and (2) whether the admission will be important
enough to the government's case. Each evaluation will be further complicated when an
investigation is at an early stage. Heidt, supra note 106, at 481.

